Iranian Ayatollah Accuses Saudi Arabia of Using Wahhabism to Divide Muslims in Iran

Babak Negahdari added that an additional 72,000 teachers are expected to retire by September 2024, further straining the Ministry of Education's ability to fill positions.

He blames the teacher shortage on several factors, including neglect of universities that train teachers, the weakening of teacher training centers, and flawed teacher employment regulations implemented between 2009 and 2021.

He additionally highlighted challenges like the low pay offered to retired teachers who return to work and the dismissal of educators for activism.

Mohammad Habibi, spokesperson for the Teachers' Trade Union, said earlier in June, "I have reliable information that dozens of newly hired teachers in just one branch of the Gilan Province Education Department have been fired for a single Instagram post,” he said, noting that it has not been made public because authorities are worried about the potential security repercussions.

He added that there are numerous similar cases across the country, and these dismissals are one of the factors contributing to the teacher shortage in education over the past two years.

These issues arise amidst a long history of government pressure and attempts to suppress teachers and union activists. In recent years, numerous teachers were detained and faced harsh prison sentences. The crackdown has intensified since the beginning of the 2022 protests.

During the debate, hardliner Zakani suggested that ‘reformist’ candidate Masoud Pezeshkian was involved in the controversial Crescent deal, a contract signed between National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and Sharjah-based Crescent Petroleum which led to a legal dispute at the Hague court and cost Iran $607 million for non-compliance with the agreement.

Zanganeh was Iran's oil minister under President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), whose government is known as Iran's reformist administration.

"During Khatami's term, the greatest betrayals in the oil sector happened to the country," Zakani said during the debate.

Jalili also accused Zanganeh of "corruption and plundering billions of dollars" concerning the Crescent deal.

Zanganeh denied these claims. In a post on X, he attached a copy of his complaint filed with Tehran's Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor and pointed to the specific charge of "publication of falsehoods" punishable by law as outlined in the Islamic Penal Code. He demanded "criminal prosecution" of Jalili and Zakani.

The attack by the two hardliners was part of their election campaign to smear Iran's 'reformists' and present themselves as fighters against corruption. Despite the reformist-hardliner dichotomy, over 60% of voters stayed away from the polls on Friday, in what is seen as a big blow to the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.

"Today I came from visiting my mother, and realized that there was an attempt on my mother's life and someone beat her up," Bakhtiari said in a video posted on X on Wednesday.

She also expressed concern for her father's well-being, stating that Manouchehr Bakhtiari's life is in danger due to illness and the prison authorities' refusal to allow for a necessary surgery.

"We are ready to be killed because this life is much worse than death," she said.

Bakhtiari criticized the authorities, asking, "How can you justify playing with the lives of my mother and father?"

This incident is not the first time Nahid Shirpisheh has faced violence in prison.

In 2022, Bakhtiari reported that her mother was "beaten by either unauthorized or state-affiliated prisoners" with officials failing to intervene, just three weeks after entering the general ward of Zanjan prison.

In her video, she mentioned that agents from the Ministry of Intelligence visited her mother in March, promising a 10-day leave "on bail of several billion Tomans."

Instead, Bakhtiari says that the Ministry of Intelligence summoned her mother two months ago, demanding she confess on camera that her son Pouya was a "troublemaker who intended to shoot at officers."

During the 2019 nationwide protests in Iran, known as Bloody November, 27-year-old Pouya was shot in the head in the city of Karaj. Sparked by hike in fuel prices, the protests quickly evolved into demands for regime change and the removal of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Pouya's family attributed his death to security forces and demanded accountability for his death and the deaths of at least 1,500 at the hands of security forces.

Bakhtiari says the authorities recently revoked her mother's leave from prison because of social media posts by their relatives, Saba and Mehrdad Bakhtiari.

In the posts, Saba and Mehrdad Bakhtiari, Pouya Bakhtiari's uncle and aunt, revealed that their cousin, Behrouz Ghadimi, was the flight technician on the Iranian president's helicopter that crashed last month. The crash killed Ghadimi and all the officials on board, including President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian.

Following her son's death, Shirpisheh has faced severe pressure from security forces, including numerous summons and arrests.

During the widespread arrests of protesters' families in 2022, Shirpisheh was detained again, and although many others were gradually released, she was sentenced to five years in prison.

Pouya Bakhtiari's father was arrested in 2021 when security forces used excessive force during his apprehension at his residence in Tehran.

A Revolutionary Court subsequently sentenced him to three years and six months in prison, two years and six months in exile, and a two-year travel ban. Subsequently, further sentences were imposed on his existing term.

A recent report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, commonly known as Chatham House, a British think tank based in London delves into the complexities surrounding Iran’s presidential election and its potential impact on the country’s foreign relations, particularly with Russia.

The recent deaths of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in May following a freak helicopter crash, have left a significant void in Iran’s foreign policy strategy according to Chatham House’s report: The two main supporters of rapprochement with Russia were Raisi and Amir-Abdollahian, the report says.

It also suggests that the future of Iranian-Russian relations, which had been moving towards a more institutionalized partnership, now hinges on the stance of the next Iranian president.

It notes that while acting President Mohammad Mokhber and acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri-Kani continue to emphasize the strategic nature of the relationship, incoming leadership may prioritize economic recovery over deepening ties with Moscow: "However, the main candidates in the presidential race are all signaling that their priorities are relieving sanctions and improving the economy – not a special relationship with Moscow."

Supreme Leader’s influence and future directions

Regardless of the outcome of the presidential elections, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s influence remains pivotal in shaping the country’s foreign policy. As highlighted by Chatham House, his endorsement of previous initiatives, including the 'turn to the East' strategy – a strategy to strengthen political, economic, and strategic ties with Eastern hemisphere countries, especially with Ruassia and China, aiming to expand alliance networks and reduce Iran’s vulnerability to Western influence – underscores Iran’s approach to navigating international pressures and sanctions.

However, the Chatham House report suggests that Khamenei’s strategic calculus may evolve depending on the election outcome and broader geopolitical shifts. It notes, "Even the Supreme Leader may change course on Russia if the interests of the regime require it."

Iran’s economic crisis

The election takes place against a backdrop of profound economic turmoil in Iran. The country is confronted with a staggering infrastructure deficit amounting to $500 billion, alongside persistent annual inflation rates exceeding 40% for the past five years. The sharp devaluation of Iran’s currency, the rial, has plunged millions of Iranians into poverty, exacerbating socioeconomic challenges. Despite Iran's vast oil reserves, gasoline shortages persist, highlighting ongoing economic complexities.

However, against this backdrop, candidates have not seriously Khamenei's strategic policies of remaining steadfast in expanding Iran's nuclear program or continuing a regional confrontation with Israel and the United States. The "revolutionary" foreign policy has gone unchallenged by the candidates. In fact, Saeed Jalili is the most hardline politician when it comes to a confrontational foreign policy.

“Two problems face whoever wins Iran’s presidential race: to bring the economy out of crisis and to reduce the external pressure exerted on the country through sanctions,” the report emphasized.

Chatham House in its report agrees that Jalili takes a confrontational stance, advocating not only forcing the lifting of sanctions but also for compelling sanctioning countries to repent.

During the fourth presidential debate, Jalili highlighted Russia's conflict with the EU as an opportunity for Iran to boost exports, such as vegetables previously imported by Russia from Europe. This has raised eyebrows in Iran that Jalili is suggesting meager income from vegetable exports, while Tehran's foreign policy has cost the country hundreds of billions of dollars in lost oil revenues and economic development.

The only so-called ‘reformist’ candidate, Masould Pezeshkian has criticized Iran’s ‘turn to the East’ strategy and suggested opening the country to the West, as well as reducing tensions with the US, the Chatham House report said. Despite this, Pezeshkian has consistently maintained that he remains loyal to Khamenei - meaning that should Khamenei decide to continue support for the 'turn to the East' strategy, Pezeshkian would follow suit.

Candidates downplay ties to Russia

The report further notes, "Immediately after Raisi’s death, the Kremlin tried to put the discussion of a long-term bilateral agreement on pause, willing to see the outcome of the presidential race in Iran."

While Russia remains a crucial ally for Iran, particularly in circumventing international sanctions and coordinating on regional security issues, the next Iranian administration’s orientation towards the West could reshape these dynamics: "Any lifting of sanctions and restoration of ties with the West will require Tehran to revise its relations with Russia, although not necessarily immediately."

​​Contrarily, the report indicated that Jalili offers scant optimism for genuine friendship with Russia. Although he does not prioritize Russia in Iran’s foreign policy discourse, rather mentions Moscow within the broader ‘turn to the East’ context alongside China and India.

Moreover, the report underscores the potential for gradual shifts in Iranian foreign policy depending on internal and external pressures: "The bottom line is that while there is no chance for the immediate and deep revision of Russian–Iranian ties, the erosion of the current format is quite possible in the medium term, should the new president succeed in launching the sanctions-lifting process."

According to the report, the increased intensity of flaring indicates a lack of investment in gas infrastructure and its utilization.

Iran ranked second globally after Russia in gas flaring levels last year and had the highest increase rate worldwide.

The country has failed to develop and install the necessary equipment to collect associated gas from oil fields over the past two decades.

According to the Oil Ministry's estimates, approximately $5 billion is needed to curb gas flaring, which accounts for about 8.5% of the country’s total gas production. The annual value of this flared gas exceeds $5 billion in regional markets. To compare, Iran's flared gas volume equals 42% of Turkey’s total gas consumption in 2023.

At the same time, natural gas consumption is increasing in the country and supplies get tighter leading to industrial disruptions.

British Petroleum (BP) also released its annual statistical review of world energy this week, reporting that greenhouse gas emissions from flaring in Iran increased by 16.3% year-on-year, reaching 43.1 million tons in 2023.

Iran’s total greenhouse gas emissions reached 927 million tons last year, ranking sixth globally.

Why is Iran’s gas flaring rising?

The World Bank attributes Iran’s increase in gas flaring to a rise in oil production.

In 2017, Iran’s gas flaring volume was just over 17 billion cubic meters when it produced up to 3.8 million barrels of crude oil per day, about 800,000 barrels more than in 2023. The reason for this contradiction is Iran's failure to install equipment at new oil fields.

The increase in flaring resulted from Iran's newly developed oil fields, particularly those managed by domestic companies, including Azadegan, Yadavaran, and Azar. However, unlike older old fields that have gas collection technology, there have been no investments in the new fields.

According to both the Iranian Oil Ministry and the US Energy Information Administration, approximately 80% of Iran’s oil production comes from aging fields that lose 8-12% of their productivity annually.

Iranian domestic companies have developed and partially launched new fields in recent years, resulting in higher gas flaring rates to compensate for declining oil production from aging fields.

In the 2000s, Iran installed associated gas collection equipment on some oil fields, relying on domestic technologies. However, after 2010, investment in oil fields declined significantly, and associated gas collection projects lost priority.

For instance, since 2018, Iran’s total annual investment in upstream oil and gas projects has been around $3 billion, down from over $7 billion in the early 2010s and $18 billion in the 2000s.

Iran suffers not only from high volumes of gas flaring but also significant methane emissions, which increased by 12% to 8.5 billion cubic meters in 2023, according to the International Energy Agency.

A significant portion of Iran's gas leakage is due to its outdated transmission and distribution network.

Iran loses about 29 billion cubic meters of its produced gas (12%) during production, transmission, and distribution stages—equivalent to the country’s total household gas demand.

Due to delays in gas field development and significant gas wastage, Iran faces a substantial gas deficit in winter, leading to increased consumption of polluting mazut and diesel instead of natural gas.

Additionally, Iran's gas exports dropped by a quarter, reaching 14.3 billion cubic meters in 2023, according to BP estimates.