Iran's Exiled Prince and Israeli Minister Discuss Diaspora Solidarity

The sources, who Iran International has not identified for their protection, are connected to a security apparatus in the Middle East.

They allege these individuals are not declaring their identity and are armed with weapons on the ship in European ports, specifically: Constanta (Romania) , Valencia (Spain) , Ravenna (Italy), and Antwerp (Belgium).

Sources said these armed IRGC forces may use this method as a means to spy and collect information in Europe - all while reportedly bypassing sanctions.

The European Union (EU) has imposed numerous sanctions against the Islamic Republic - including individuals with the IRGC, government officials and entities. This is in response to Iran's human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation activities and military support for Russia's war in Ukraine.

To date, 227 individuals and 42 entities have been sanctioned.

In May, the EU added new sanctions targeting persons and entities supplying, selling or involved in the transferring of Iran's missiles and drones in support of the Kremlin and for armed groups in the Middle-East and the Red Sea.

Defense and security analyst Farzin Nadimi, a Senior Fellow with the Washington Institute, said that onboard armed guards are usually not allowed in European ports, unless there is a reason, in which case they must identify themselves as per individual port regulations.

Iran International’s sources said the alleged IRGC men concealed themselves as ordinary seafarers to circumvent Iran’s sanctions to allegedly engage in nefarious activities. An action that violates International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations, said Nadimi, who specializes in military affairs.

“They [armed guards] are needed only for the pirates…pirate infested waters,” said Nadimi.

“Many shipping corridors, shipping lanes or canals like the Suez Canal do not usually allow armed guards aboard commercial ships,” he added.

The IMO responded to Iran International’s investigation, stating in an email, that "Flag States set the level of security on board their ships and approve their ships’ security plans, including requirements for armed personnel. Port States will also set their own requirements for ships that want to dock in their ports."

Spain and Romania, for example, require a declaration and authorization of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) and weapons in their ports. This can only be in areas deemed ‘high risk’, which according to their port regulations online is "an area as defined in the Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (MSC.1/Circ.1339) unless otherwise defined by the flag State."

With regards to Iran, the IMO said it does “not have specific information on the use of armed personnel on IRI flag ships.”

Maritime "Smuggling"

Sources said the IRGC is transporting Quds forces and weaponry from Iran to Syria by sea before entering European ports.

Iran’s alleged use of armed IRGC men and smuggling weaponry for its proxies is likely in response to Israeli attacks on air and land infrastructure in Syria and Lebanon, according to Jason Brodsky, the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran.

In 2021, the port of Latakia was targeted by air strikes, but Israel did not claim to be behind it. Though it is not unusual for Israel not to take responsibility for operations in Syria.

“They [Iran] are adjusting the routes, the smuggling routes that they have used in the past from land to air and now to maritime smuggling. And that's because Israel has targeted a lot of the land and air corridors,” said Brodsky.

A recent report by the Telegraph, citing sources in Israel, alleged that Iran uses European ports to provide cover for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah.

The unnamed sources told the British outlet that Hezbollah has received missiles and bombs on ships that go on to dock in European ports like Belgium, Spain and Italy. Those weapons are reportedly used to attack Israel.

“It goes to Hezbollah. It goes to militias in Syria. It goes to, Palestinian militant groups, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” said Brodsky.

Brodsky said the IRGC is highly skilled at smuggling arms, oil, people, and goods for its “nefarious purposes worldwide.”

In 2022, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned members of an international oil smuggling network that reportedly facilitated oil trades and generated revenue for Hezbollah and the IRCG-Qods Force.

Brodsky said the ships likely bypass customs with “payoffs” and attempts to make the cargo look “benign” embedding weapons, for example, in a ship meant for humanitarian cargo.

“These networks are predominantly for the Quds Force to ship illicit contraband and other kinds of products to avoid a paper trail and to try to legitimize the cargo that they're using,” said Brodsky.

Richard Goldberg, a Senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) said that Iran, especially since the October 7 massacre, is on a march to strengthen itself around the world and is on the offence.

Armed IRGC operatives on board these fleets is not surprising to Goldberg, but he said it is concerning.

“They [Europe] may know about them, they may not even be looking for them. But they certainly allow them to fundraise, to activate, to recruit and potentially, move in and out of their countries, at various ports. Because their names are not on list to be denied visas or entry.”

Goldberg said it’s further evidence for the European Union (EU) to enlist the IRGC a terrorist entity and push for greater alliances across the transatlantic.

“To build a transatlantic alliance to counter these malign activities that are a danger not just to European soil, but ultimately to North America as well,” he said.

While not providing extensive details, state media cited Esmail Khatib as saying that the warning was in response to 'misconduct' displayed by some candidates.

Iran’s Press Supervisory Board also issued a directive concerning the elections, warning that violators will be punished with 74 lashes. The instructions, published on Wednesday, specified that disseminating content aimed at “the boycott of the elections and the lowering of participation” and “organizing any form of unauthorized protest gathering, strike, or sit-in” constitutes a "crime.”

The warnings follow Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's speech on Monday in which he urged contenders to avoid slander and refrain from smearing each other. Conspicuous confrontations have already emerged among several of the 80 candidates who enrolled during the designated five-day registration period, with the election campaign officially starting June 12 until June 26.

The snap elections have been called following the sudden death of Ebrahim Raisi with First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber taking the helm as acting president on the orders of Khamenei.

On Sunday, Tasnim, a news outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and reportedly a supporter of Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament, criticized Vahid Haghanian, a prominent figure in the office of the Supreme Leader, without explicitly naming him, asserting that he is not the Supreme Leader’s preferred candidate.

"Some individuals have registered for the presidential race despite lacking relevant experience and executive responsibility. More concerning, their campaign materials imply endorsement by the Supreme Leader's office, a tactic that is unethical and undermines the dignity of this esteemed institution," Tasnim wrote.

The next day, Haghanian responded that the news agency uses military funds for matters unrelated to the public interest.

“People recognize that all these desperate efforts by the passive media in the most sensitive areas of the country are rooted in their candidate’s defeat,” the statement read.

The ongoing process of narrowing the circle of trusted regime insiders, criticized as political "purification," seemingly aimed at preparing for the eventual death of the 85-year-old Supreme Leader, has intensified power struggles among the conservative spectrum.

Last week, physical confrontations erupted in parliament between supporters of two MPs, one reportedly failed the credential verification to remain a parliamentarian.

Record low turnout for the elections is expected amid mass discontent and disenfranchisement. In the March elections, while official figures claimed around 40 percent of the population came to the polls, independent figures suggest closer to 10. In the last two rounds of presidential elections figures have also seen Iranians boycott the polls, aware that ultimately the Supreme Leader himself will decide the incoming Presidential candidate.

The last presidential elections in 2021 saw the lowest recorded turnout since the founding of the Islamic Republic. While official figures claimed around 41 percent voted, like March, the real numbers are believed to have been much lower.

“From the JCPOA until the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting, in compliance with their roles as good and bad cop, the US and the European Troika have been trying to manage Iran’s reactions to their misbehavior by creating false hope in Iran. They have never been successful & never will be,” Ali Shamkhani wrote on X.

On Wednesday, the Board of Governors of the UN nuclear watchdog passed a resolution censuring Iran and demanding it resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA regarding its nuclear program.

The resolution, initiated by the E3 coalition, France, Britain, and Germany, garnered substantial backing, with 20 member states endorsing it. Notably, the dissenting votes came from China and Russia, staunch allies of Iran. Additionally, 12 countries opted for abstention during the decision-making process.

The United States was widely reported to have opposed the resolution in the days leading up to the IAEA board meeting. Seemingly, Washington was concerned that Tehran might respond to the sanctions with an expansion of its nuclear program marked by the enrichment of uranium and the stockpiling of enough fissile material for several warheads.

Shamkhani had previously stated that Iran would retaliate against any condemnation from the IAEA board. "If some misguided European countries intend to adopt a hostile stance towards Iran's peaceful nuclear program at the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting, on the eve of Iran's presidential elections, they will face a serious and effective response from our country,” Shamkhani had warned.

The Iranian state media also reacted by suggesting that the UN nuclear agency's Board of Governors resolution was premature, particularly given the recent death of Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash and the upcoming snap elections.

The Iran-based Fararu news site highlighted “the current executive vacuum in the country” and expressed doubts about “the temporary decision-makers' ability to reach a conclusive decision” regarding nuclear matters.

Another news outlet, KhabarOnline, took a particularly bleak stance, suggesting that "The European Troika [E3] is preparing the groundwork for the activation of the 'snapback' mechanism."

The term "snapback" denotes the procedural mechanism outlined in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231, pertaining to the potential reinstatement of UN sanctions and constraints on the Islamic Republic of Iran. This resolution endorsed the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, formally recognized as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

In 2015, Iran and several global powers, including the United States, signed the JCPOA, which imposed significant constraints on Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. However, then US President Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement in 2018, citing its purported failure to effectively address Iran's missile program and regional influence. Consequently, Iran has continued to disregard the stipulated limitations on its nuclear endeavors. The UN nuclear chief, Rafael Grossi, recently said Iran was “weeks not months” away from a nuclear weapon in spite of Tehran denying it has ambitions for a nuclear weapons program.

Since then, Iran has been non-cooperative with the IAEA on various fronts, and tensions between Tehran and the agency have steadily escalated. The Iranian administration has dismantled surveillance apparatuses, rebuffed senior inspectors' access requests, and withheld information regarding the whereabouts of new nuclear installations. This stance persists despite Iran's assertion that its uranium enrichment endeavors are exclusively for civilian applications and disavowal of any intention to pursue nuclear armaments.

As per an IAEA assessment, Iran is enriching uranium up to 60% purity, nearing the 90% threshold indicative of weapons-grade material. Moreover, it has stockpiled sufficient material for further enrichment, potentially yielding three nuclear warheads.

Centrist daily Ham Mihan also quoted Khatami on Wednesday as having said that Iran has a long way to achieve a standard free, fair and competitive election.

A reformist paper noted that the 80 politicians who registered their candidacy are vastly different from the general population in terms of political views, affiliations, ethnicity, religious values, and lifestyle. In the best-case scenario, they can represent only 30 to 35 percent of the people. The small number—perhaps four to six—whose qualifications will be approved will most certainly be even less representative.

Javad Emam, the spokesperson for the Reform Front, an umbrella organization of several ‘reformist’ groups and political parties, had said earlier that based on the Front's election strategy, the coalition will take part in the election only if one of its nominated candidates receives approval by the Guardian Council.

The 12-member Council, which is under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s control, has rejected hundreds of candidates in parliamentary and presidential elections over the years and specially since 2020. This policy has directly contributed to the dominance of conservatives and hardliners both in the parliament and in the government.

The Reform Front had boycotted the parliamentary election in March and at least one presidential election in 2020 because none of its candidates were endorsed by the conservative-dominated Guardian Council.

Emam who has always been pessimistic about prospects for reformists' participation in the June 28 presidential election accused the Guardian Council in a post on social media platform X on June 5 of violating the Iranian Constitution by usurping Iranians' right to choose their president.

Despite statements by Khatami and Reform Front spokesman Emam, the coalition has not officially nominated any candidates. The press has speculated about potential reformist candidates, including former Roads Minister Abbas Akhundi, former Deputy Intelligence Minister Mohammad Shariatmadari, and moderates such as former Vice President Es'haq Jahangiri and former Majles Speaker Ali Larijani.

However, it remains unclear whether the Reform Front would be satisfied with centrists like Jahangiri or Larijani being approved to run, or if they will demand a more committed reformist to receive approval from the Guardian Council.

This leaves only the outspoken Akhundi who is better known as a moderate figure than a reformist, and Shariatmadari. None of them are known by young pro-reform voters if they ever decide to vote in the June 28 election.

In fact, Iran's reformist figures have long been criticized for failing to train younger cadres over the past 20 years. Even when they held the presidency from 1997 to 2005, Khatami had to select most of his cabinet ministers from his predecessor President Rafsanjani's team of technocrats. Furthermore, under immense pressure from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the hardliner-dominated judiciary, the reformist government was significantly less effective in its second term (2000-2004). Most of its achievements, including relative media freedom, were dismantled, and dozens of journalists and political activists ended up in jail or were forced to flee the country and live in exile.

The question arises: why do reformists, despite the pressures, sometimes accept the humiliating situation imposed on them by hardliners, and why are some so eager to participate in the elections? They certainly know that hardliners will ensure that, even if they must endorse one or two reform-minded candidates, they will choose those with the least popularity among voters.

The bigger question is whether voters will support a reformist candidate. Khatami, who has tarnished his reputation by not forcefully opposing a totalitarian government, may not be able to rally support. The embarrassing silence of dozens of reformists in the parliament (2016-2020) during the deadly crackdown on the 2019 protesters further undermines their credibility. It remains to be seen if reformists can convince the new generation of voters to support them.

A still bigger question is why there aren't any younger candidates. Many named as reformist candidates are in their 70s. Is the reform front going to recognize the younger generation of Iranians? Is it aware of the fundamental change in the political narrative and rhetoric after the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom movement?

It is uncertain if younger voters can identify themselves with politicians such as Khatami, who are still trying to walk a political tightrope with hard core of the Islamist rulers.

Ironically, the same newspaper that carried Khatami's statement ran another story that said most of the candidates in this election are older than 65, and asked: Should there be a retirement age for those interested in executive positions?

Pakdel's Instagram post suggested that politics transform "stupid men into special diet cutlets". The term "cutlet" gained notoriety following the death of IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani in a 2020 US drone strike, which left his body mutilated.

The crackdown has intensified in the wake of the helicopter crash that killed President Ebrahim Raisi and several companions in East Azarbaijan province last month. The incident, which led to widespread public celebrations, was seen by many as a repudiation of Raisi's oppressive policies with the government responding harshly to the expressions of joy.

Dozens were detained for their online celebrations, actions that the Tehran Prosecutor's Office claimed were necessary to maintain social order.

He is one of dozens of public figures from fields such as entertainment and sport to be heavily punished as the government fights ongoing dissent in the wake of the 2022 uprising. Many have been punished not only with prison sentences but with the likes of bank account freezes, travel bans, pay cuts and working bans.