Three US lawmakers have asked the Justice Department to investigate the International Crisis Group, after a report by Iran International revealed that the ICG signed an undisclosed deal with the Iranian government in 2016.
In a letter dated February 5 addressed to Attorney General Merrick Garland, a copy of which was obtained by Iran International, US Representative Jim Banks (R-IN), Elise Stefanik (R-NY) and Mike Waltz (R-Fl) call for an investigation into the potential violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) by the ICG, a think tank that advises the US government.
An investigation by Iran International, published last week, showed that the Iranian government in 2016 signed a previously undisclosed agreement with the International Crisis Group, and used the organization to lobby the Obama administration on its behalf about nuclear issues.
According to a cache of documents obtained by Iran International, the Crisis Group signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s in-house think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), but never made it public. The MoU outlined a framework for “scientific and academic interactions,” aimed to “promote and intensify the friendship and the mutual understanding,” the documents showed.
“FARA requires all individuals in the United States acting as agents of foreign principals to regularly disclose their status and activities as a foreign agent to the Department of Justice,” the lawmakers noted in their letter to Mr. Garland. They emphasized that the law was meant to prevent organizations operating in the United States “from secretly serving the interests of a foreign power and to provide transparency to reduce foreign agents’ ability to credibly promote propaganda from hostile governments.”
The Crisis Group is headquartered in Belgium, but also maintains “a substantial presence in the United States,” according to the lawmakers. “While the Crisis Group ostensibly conducts research on conflict resolution, recent reporting has revealed that the group has a disturbing and longstanding official relationship with the government of Iran,” they said.
More than 50 Western research institutions - including the Crisis Group - had boycotted the Iranian foreign ministry’s IPIS for hosting a anti-Holocaust conference in 2006, but the Crisis Group was one of two organizations that reversed course and signed a formal agreement with the IPIS a decade later.
A half-dozen leaders in Western think tanks expressed surprise to Iran International and Semafor, our partner in the investigation, that the Crisis Group entered into a formal research agreement with the IPIS and said the partnerships with foreign governments, especially Iran, could raise concerns about the think tank's objectivity and potential lobbying for foreign interests.
A sanctions attorney based in Washington, who requested anonymity, said that from a legal liability perspective, there was a question of whether the Crisis Group complied with the registration requirements outlined in FARA or the Lobbying Disclosure Act if they were actively advocating for Iranian interests within the United States.
Responding to questions on this occasion, the think tank told Iran International, “Crisis Group only acts to resolve conflict, not for or on any country's behalf. Iran’s threats to our staff and accusations that we work for the US and Israeli governments have been ongoing for more than a decade and underscore our independence. We are fully compliant with U.S. law.”
However, the members of Congress concluded their letter by demanding a Justice Department investigation. “There is a clear pattern of behavior indicating that the Crisis Group is in fact not an independent organization, but a chief mouthpiece of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the United States. Given this evidence, we urge you to launch an investigation of the Crisis Group without delay for potential FARA violations to protect our nation from malign foreign influence.”
Amidst growing tensions between the government and the populace, football has morphed into a battleground for ideological conflict. At the heart of the dispute lies the question: Is the team representing Iran truly the national team, or merely a tool of the regime? On both sides of the debate, myriad factions offer diverse perspectives. This strife is absent in less prominent sports like water polo, badminton, and skiing, where neither the government nor the people invest significant interest, rendering them immune to political exploitation.
The convergence of the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement with the 2022 World Cup in Qatar catapulted this struggle onto the streets, prompting some to rally behind opposing teams—some even cheered for the American team after Iran's defeat in their match. In this clash, several youths fell victim to the regime's brutality, like Mehran Sammmak in Bandar Anzali. Although the Asian Games in 2024 saw less street activism, the conflict rages on through social media and traditional channels.
Arguments from both camps:
“Regime’s Squad”
Those branding the existing team as the regime's squad cite several factors. Foremost is the regime's penchant for anti-meritocracy and ideological vetting, even in sports. Under the Islamist regime's totalitarian grip, no sphere of life remains immune to government intervention. The regime extends special privileges to footballers, including duty-free luxury imports and generous state-backed salaries. These perks serve as ideological carrots, motivating players to echo regime rhetoric, as exemplified by Qala Noui's post-match gratitude to divine intervention after a victory.
Furthermore, the regime's propaganda machine operates in overdrive within football, from orchestrated spectator attendance to grandiose declarations by top officials upon victory. The regime intertwines football successes with national achievements, glorifying players' meetings with high-ranking officials and showering them with accolades. The regime's obsession with celebrity status extends to football, positioning players as national icons.
Additionally, footballers face constant surveillance, with every word and action scrutinized. Their families are not spared from intimidation, reinforcing the regime's grip over players' public personas. Despite expectations of solidarity with the populace, footballers remain tethered to the regime's narrative, perpetuating its agenda regardless of match outcomes.
People expect a national team to be with them in their joys and sorrows, something the current football team fails to do in the view of many Iranians, who return the attitude by turning their backs to them.
National Team
Conversely, proponents of the team as the national squad offer a contrasting narrative. They argue that many players are European-based professionals selected on merit rather than political allegiance. While the regime may exploit players for propaganda, it does not define their allegiance. Some players have demonstrated dissent, supporting past protests like the 2009 Green Movement, indicating their independence from regime narratives.
However, the issue is not about a few players voicing solidarity with protesters, but the attitude of the team as a whole.
Victories by the team elicit national jubilation, transcending regime affiliations. Despite forced interactions with regime figures, players harbor no illusions about their roles as symbols of national pride. Their mandate is not to champion dissent but to represent the nation on the global stage.
The absence of comprehensive surveys complicates attributing public sentiment, or the exact attitudes of team members. Nonetheless, verifiable accounts underscore the chasm between regime control and public sentiment, demonstrating that both sentiments exist among the populace.
Ali Fekri stated that almost half of this figure is related to the oil and gas sector, with Russia leading other foreign investors with $2.7 billion in funds.
He went on to say that the attracted investment value during the last fiscal year, from March 2022 to 2023, was $4.2 billion. However, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Iran attracted only $1.5 billion in foreign direct investment in 2022.
Fekri's claim about $10.6 billion in "foreign investment" came after he recently cited the figure of $9.2 billion in an interview with the semi-official Tasnim news agency on November 23, 2023.
He explained at the time that the figure doesn’t mean $9.2 billion foreign cash funds flowed into the country; rather, it is the amount of "approved investment projects and contracts by foreigners" since the start of the Raisi administration. In simpler terms, what he refers to as "attracted foreign investment" is indeed the value of contracts with foreigners.
Fekri also mentioned that during the last fiscal year ending March 21, 2023, Iran attracted $4.2 billion in foreign investment, about 170% more than the previous year. However, UNCTAD's statistics do not indicate any significant investment inflow to Iran during 2022 compared to 2021.
He did not elaborate on why his claimed "attracted investment value" increased from $9.2 billion to $10.6 billion since November 2023, especially considering that Iran has not announced any new contracts with foreigners in the last three months. He named Russia, China, UAE, and Turkey as the biggest "investors" in Iran since August 2021.
Russian 'Investment'
Regarding Russian "investment," his claim about attracting $2.7 billion in investment came while Russian companies have only sealed contracts to drill wells in seven Iranian oil fields. This represents service exports rather than investment contracts. For example, one of these companies, Russian ZN Vostok Ltd., is obligated to drill 20 wells and install 22 pumps in the Cheshme Khosh oil field. Its CEO, Azamat Faridovich Ismagilov, stated that the total value of contracts with Iran is $500 million, including $170 million for the Cheshme Khosh field.
It’s CEO, Azamat Faridovich Ismagilov said on February 6 that ZN Vostok’s total value of contracts with Iran is $500 million, including $170 million on Cheshme Khosh field. “We have three drilling rigs in Iran and have a plan to add another one for drilling 6 new wells”.
ZN Vostok signed the contract with Iran in April 2022 to develop the above-mentioned field. It has increased the field’s production by 29% to 62,000 barrels per day so far by drilling 14 wells.
Iran has a history of exaggerating cooperation levels with its "anti-western" partners like Russia and China, especially when good economic news becomes scarce and the national currency, rial, nosedives. Since the beginning of January the rial has lost more than 10 percent of its value against the US dollar and other major currencies.
For instance, while Iran proudly announced the signing of the "largest oil and gas agreements in the country's history worth $40 billion” with Russian Gazprom in 2022, Morteza Behruzifar, an energy expert in Tehran told the ILNA news website that even before the Western sanctions on Russia, it had not invested a penny in Iran.
Like most Russian companies, Gazprom is hardly in a position to invest in another country. Its revenues plunged to $3.1 billion in the first half of 2023, from $16.5 billion in 2022.
Although Gazprom plans to invest $17.5 billion in 2024, 20 percent less than 2023, none of its mentioned investment are related to Iran.