Senior visiting fellow, George Mason University
Iran’s recently stated plan to build four more nuclear power reactors has raised questions about its feasibility as the country wrestles with economic crisis and isolation.
According to early estimates, work has started in the southern region with a five-thousand-megawatt total capacity in mind. With 4,000 employment prospects and an estimated $20 billion cost, the planned nine-year schedule raises questions under current economic circumstances.
The difficulties Iran has faced in building new power plants in the last ten years raise doubts about whether the 25,000 megawatts of new electricity that the previous national development plan sought to bring about can be achieved.
The Iranian government pledged to raise the percentage of renewable and clean energy power plants to a minimum of five percent in line with the sixth development plan (2017–2021). However, the share of nuclear power is currently one percent, which means that the program's goals have been significantly missed.
The Research Center of the Iranian Parliament emphasizes that over 80 percent of the nation's energy is thermally produced, heavily reliant on natural gas, necessitating a diversification of the energy generation portfolio.
The only nuclear power plant in the country is a 1,000 megawatt facility that started up in 2011 with help from Russia. A 300 megawatt plant is reportedly under construction in Khuzestan.
Building times for nuclear power plants vary greatly due to factors like supply chain maturity, design revisions, and project management efficiency, but Iran faces a severe electricity shortage now. Consumption peaked at over 72,000 megawatts in 2023, surpassing the actual production capacity of power plants, capped at 60,000 megawatts during the warm season.
Iran is facing several obstacles in its efforts to build further nuclear power reactors, including financial and technological constraints, geopolitical and political instability, and international sanctions. The interplay of political and economic dynamics, together with worries about public opinion, safety, and international compliance, complicate Iran's nuclear energy development scenario. Moreover, Mohammad Eslami, the head of Iran’s nuclear energy said last week that Tehran is planning to build the new reactors relying on domestic financing and knowhow.
One interesting finding is that Iran seems to value nuclear energy security more than its overall needs for energy production. The strategic emphasis on deterrent and national security capabilities highlights a departure from the traditional objective of increasing nuclear power generation for energy purposes. Iran's attitude to international engagement, technical collaborations, and safety considerations in the nuclear realm may be greatly impacted by this strategic direction.
With its protracted delays and non-operational issues, Iran's first nuclear power plant—built with Russian assistance—remains insufficient to the country's energy security.
Iran's nuclear efforts are made more difficult by the geopolitical environment, namely by its confrontational foreign policy and various sanctions.
The question of whether these initiatives are feasible arises from the effect of sanctions on international collaboration and technical development. Iran must perform a sophisticated diplomatic dance to strike a balance between its desire for energy security and international relations as well as sanctions.
Examining Iran's foreign policy, one can see that the country is committed to scientific progress even in the face of external challenges, as seen by its tenacity in pursuing its nuclear program despite sanctions. Careful navigation is necessary to resolve the delicate dance between energy demands, geopolitical concerns, and the difficulties presented by international sanctions. Iran's prospects for the energy sector both at home and abroad will depend on how well it can surmount these challenges.
A recent poll conducted by an unnamed government agency, presumably the intelligence or interior ministry, which was briefly mentioned by the semi-official Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) found that turnout would be around 30 percent at the national level and less than 15 percent in the capital Tehran, the lowest-ever in the history of the Islamic Republic.
Information from the poll has been disseminated across various news outlets, but due to concerns about the potential for an extremely low voter turnout, authorities have resorted to censorship to prevent the exacerbation of an already critical situation.
On Tuesday, Khabar Online, a news website associated with former moderate conservative parliament speaker Ali Larijani, disclosed that they had received phone calls from unidentified individuals instructing them to remove the article covering the poll results from their website. They were informed that publishing any polls related to elections was deemed illegal.
The government's ineffectiveness, rampant corruption within state entities, and the dire economic conditions that have resulted in a significant decline in the living standards of working- and middle-class Iranians are some of the factors contributing to the electorate's decision to abstain from voting in both parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections. Additionally, the harsh suppression of protests, such as the Woman, Life, Freedom protests in 2022-23, as well as earlier demonstrations in 2019 and 2017, along with the continuous erosion of social and political freedoms, have fueled a lack of trust in the system.
“I won’t vote. Anyone who votes will be a partner in the killing of the youth of the country”, “I will not vote for the sake of the Iranian girls who were blinded by the child-killing dictator”, “I will not vote, for the sake of my country and for people who want happiness,” people say in their tweets.
Many, including former regime insiders from various factions, such as reformists, supporters of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and moderate conservatives, argue that the extensive vetting of candidates by the Guardian Council in favor of hardliners has left them with no viable options to vote for.
“I have participated in all the elections so far. I really want to vote, but no candidate whose ideas are close to mine has been approved. How can I really vote? I can’t participate in the elections in these circumstances,” another tweet said.
Hardliners who dominate the current parliament had promised to fight poverty, corruption, discrimination, and inefficiency in government bodies but after four years the situation has only worsened.
“What you call ‘elections’ and consider participating in it a religious obligation is closer to ‘pledging allegiance’ to those in power both in form and meaning,” Farhad Badragheh, a member of Iran's Bar Association tweeted.
Regime supporters almost invariably say they will vote because Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei says they must. In June 2009, just days before the controversial presidential elections, Khamenei emphasized that people would not vote if they lacked hope in the country's future, did not trust the system, or did not feel free. He remarked, "When there is no trust, participation will be low. When participation is low, the legitimacy of the system will be affected."
“[I vote] because the future of my country is important to me, because my leader emphasizes on participating in the elections, and because anyone with common sense agrees with participating in the elections,” a regime loyalist said in his tweet with the hashtag #Iwillvote.
Following Khamenei’s lead, other state officials also insist that voting is a religious duty and claim that it is the enemies of the Islamic Republic who are trying to disillusion people.
The Friday Imam of Esfahan, Yousef Tabatabaei Nejad, said last week that those who do not vote are not Muslims and by not voting in these elections they are casting their ballots for the enemies of the regime.
On Friday night, the United States hit about 85 targets linked to IRGC Quds Force and affiliated militia groups in Iraq and Syria, but fears of direct US retaliation to the Iran-backed attack in Jordan that killed three US soldiers and wounded scores did not materialize.
The Biden administration after waiting for five days, targeted bases and warehouses belonging to IRGC proxy forces in Syria and Iraq, after multiple reports indicated that these forces evacuated key personnel and perhaps some weapons.
The regime’s reaction to recent US attacks in Iraq and Syria has not exceeded its usual rhetoric of condemnation and accusations against “the enemy.”
Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian condemned the attacks on Thursday, saying they stem from Washington’s “continued wrong and failed approach to resolving issues by resorting to force and militarism.”
Earlier in the day, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kanaani also dismissed the US offensives as an “adventurous action” and a “strategic mistake,” claiming that they violate international law, the UN Charter, and sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria.
The Iranian currency also somewhat regained its footing, after falling more than 15 percent since early January due to rising regional tensions.
Meanwhile, the Syrian government, Hamas, and Iran-backed Iraqi militant groups Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Hashd al-Shaabi condemned the attacks as well.
Hamas said the “aggression” was an attempt to “cover up Israel’s horrific crimes” in the Gaza Strip.
The Syrian Foreign Ministry warned that the attacks can “fuel conflict in the Middle East in a very dangerous way.”
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s office also condemned the airstrikes as a “new aggression against Iraq's sovereignty,” announcing they killed 16 people, including civilians, and injured 25.
The US-led coalition in the region “has become a reason for threatening security and stability in Iraq and a justification for involving Iraq in regional and international conflicts,” the office added.
State-sponsored and military-affiliated news agencies in Iran also covered US operations in Iraq and Syria.
IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency reiterated the regime’s rhetoric regarding the incident and even claimed that the Tehran-backed umbrella group, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, carried out a missile attack against Ain al-Asad Air Base in the western province of Anbar, where US forces are stationed. The attack has not yet been confirmed by US officials.
Fars, another IRGC affiliated news agency, published a report titled “‘Belated and Failed Attacks’: Biden Administration under Criticism.”
Citing Roger Wicker, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, US House Speaker Mike Johnson, and Mike Pompeo, former secretary of state, Fars concluded that the recent US military operations in Iraq and Syria have failed to appease the critics of President Joe Biden, who has been under increasing pressure over the past days to retaliate against Iran and its proxies.
In what can be interpreted as an indirect reaction, IRNA, the Iranian state news agency, reported on Iran’s “defensive and military capabilities.”
Rouydad24, a relatively independent news agency in Iran, tried to distance itself from the mouthpieces of the regime and adopted a more analytical approach.
Rouydad24 conducted an interview with former Iranian lawmaker Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, who once served as the head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian parliament.
Falahatpisheh discussed the “propaganda” objectives of Biden’s administration and stressed that the recent attacks were intended for “domestic consumption” in the US.
Discussing the relationship between Tehran and militant groups in the region, he remarked, “Now it is too late for Iran to say that it is not coordinating with the resistance forces.”
Iran has avoided any direct military involvement in the Israel-Hamas conflict and has instead used its proxy groups such as Houthis and Hezbollah to attack Israeli and American targets in the Middle East. Nonetheless, Iranian officials claim these groups act “independently” and do not receive direct orders from Iran.