Iranian Newspaper Calls For Targeting Israeli Airbases

Besides immediate fears of war and conflict, Iranian media also highlight expectations of a low turnout amid a general indifference to the regime’s highly manipulated elections.

Nevertheless, Iranian media are passionately discussing what the election might hold for Iranians, although almost all of them are quite sure that ultraconservatives will win the majority of seats in the parliament (Majles).

Reports in the reformist media alternate between the news of fresh divides and new alliances in the conservative camp. Arman Melli, a reformist daily, wrote last week with a high degree of certainty that "Conservatives are unlikely to reach unity."

The daily argued that although it is too early to predict what will happen in the conservative camp, the dynamics among conservative groups indicate that there is a likelihood of an alliance, and it is almost certain that Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf's name will be at the top of the conservatives' list of candidates.

This comes despite Ghalibaf not being the most popular figure among Iranian conservatives, as even members of the parliament have lately criticized him harshly for his inaction and his failure to establish the parliament's supervisory role.

Yet, the daily speculated that there are more signs in the conservative camp indicating divides among various groups. Arman Melli wrote that the sheer number of various groups is more indicative of divides than alliances. The daily noted that all conservative groups in Iran believe that unity is something good only if they are the leader of the alliance. This is what can easily turn the illusion of an alliance into solid signs of divide.

Another pro-reform daily, Arman Emrooz, wrote on January 16 that an alliance is likely to be formed by conservative groups, led by the hardliner Paydari Party, which holds the majority in the current Majles and most of the cabinet ministers of the Raisi Administration are its members. The daily argued that accepting Paydari's leadership is the only condition that can bring about an alliance among Iranian conservatives.

Arman Emrooz added that key conservative figures such as father figure Gholam Ali Haddad Adel and Assadollah Badamchian of the Islamic Coalition Party have already agreed that Paydari should lead other conservative parties and political groups. Although the two men are influential enough, but other conservative groups have still not voiced their views about Paydari's leadership.

Badamchain has recently said that his party has 200 candidates for constituencies all over the country. It appears that there is currently an agreement among conservatives that Paydari should continue to hold the majority of the Majles under the speakership of current Speaker Mohammad Baghert Ghalibaf. This was the arrangement that was first made after the current Majles convened for the first time in May 2020. Ghalibaf does not have a big number of followers in or out of the parliament, but despite essential differences, even Paydari agrees that as a relative of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ghalibaf can be a good leader for the Majles, and his kinship ties gives him the leverage to resist pressures coming from the executive branch.

However, Ghalibaf has powerful rivals in the internal election for choosing a speaker. Paydari's Leader Sadeq Mahsouli, and the Chairman of its Central Council Morteza Aqa Tehrani have always been serious competitors for the post. In the next Majles, there is a true conservative heavyweight Ghalibaf and others need to tackle: Mohammad Reza Bahonar. Even hardliner Mohammad Hossein Naqavi Hosseini says Bahonar stands way higher than others in the competition for the post of the speaker of the parliament.

The only thing that can stop Bahonar, a seasoned politician and a former Vice Speaker, from rising to the position of Speaker is a sold alliance among other conservative groups, Naqavi Hosseini said.

Eqtesad100, a prominent Iranian news website, scrutinized the contradictory statements from government officials and bakers in a detailed report on Sunday. The situation became more complex with reports circulating about a directive from the Baker's Union.

While some sources suggested citizens are prohibited from purchasing more than "four loaves with one bank card," Eqtesad100, citing confirmed reports from the union, indicated that the sale of "more than three Barbari breads with one bank card" is prohibited.

The reported restrictions, if violated by bakers, trigger a penalty, as they receive a notification of "unauthorized sale" in a specialized system.

Amir Karamlou, head of the inspection commission of the Traditional Bakers' Union in Tehran, said on Saturday that Tehran bakers must adhere to specific requirements.

“To earn certification, (Barbari) bakers must sell each sack of flour to 32 people, with each transaction involving a different bank card.”

The reports also indicate that the sale of more than 10 Lavash bread to a single individual is prohibited.

Contradicting the measures, Mohammad Jalal, the economic adviser to the economy minister, asserted three days ago that "nothing has happened in the field of bread supply." He described the new measures as an effort to “organize the bread situation and prevent the smuggling of flour and bread. Bakers are now required to register the amount of bread sold and conduct transactions exclusively through bank cards.”

However, an informed source confirmed a reduction in the flour quota provided by the government and bread rationing in specific areas, hinting at a potential review of plans to review subsidies and increase prices.

This contradicts earlier declarations by Iranian officials who categorized price hikes and rationing of traditional bread as red lines.

Introduced in April 2018 amid economic uncertainties triggered by former US President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran's national subsidy aimed to stabilize prices for essential goods.

As the national currency faced a significant decline, the government, led by President Hassan Rouhani, provided cheap dollars to importers, particularly for vital commodities like flour.

On May 1, 2022, the parliament, despite warnings of increased inflation, approved the government's decision to eliminate the annual $10-14 billion subsidy for essential food and medicine. The move, coupled with an existing inflation rate of around 40 percent, resulted in a ten-fold increase in the price of flour.

To mitigate the impact on citizens, President Ebrahim Raisi's administration introduced a "smart plan" for the continued subsidy of bread. The government issued digital cards tied to specific purchases, aiming to prevent the smuggling of subsidized flour and bread to neighboring countries where they could be sold at significantly higher prices.

However, bakers have raised concerns about the ration card system, citing disruptions in trade during internet outages and delays in government reimbursement for subsidized bread. The challenges faced by bakers have highlighted issues with the implementation of the new system.

The substantial surge in flour prices, following the removal of subsidies, has had a ripple effect on various other goods, including pasta, biscuits, and cakes. These price increases have affected consumers, particularly those in vulnerable economic conditions. Additionally, bakeries offering non-traditional loaf breads operate at unsubsidized prices, creating disparities in the cost of different bread varieties.

In spite of this and in the face of global sanctions, Iran continues to pour billions of dollars' worth of funding into its regional proxies and the domestic military budget, while the nation faces crippling economic turmoil.

Palestinian groups alone such as Gaza based Hamas, have been found to receive around $100m annually, according to US government evidence. Larger proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, receive much more.

It is believed that Amirpour, a first-semester physical education student at Azad University lost her life when intelligence forces pursued the car she was in. The car's driver, M. Jalayi-far, also a student and Borujerd resident, sustained severe injuries and is currently hospitalized.

Hengaw Human Rights Organization, a Kurdish rights group, says the intelligence forces claim the incident was linked to a recent terror attack in Kerman. Two explosions during the fourth memorial of former IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani on January 3 killed around 90 people in Kerman. The strategy aims to reframe the intentional killing as part of a scripted security case.

It is not clear why the agents tried to stop the car, although some speculate that it could be hijab enforcement related.

Rights group sources indicate that as the plainclothes forces approached the students' car, instructing them to stop and exit the vehicle, the intimidated driver panicked and attempted to flee. Subsequently, the intelligence forces opened fire and seized the car.

Over the past two days, security entities have reportedly pressured the families and friends of the victims not to disclose information about the incident. Two personnel from Chamran Hospital were also summoned and threatened by intelligence authorities.

While security and law enforcement authorities in Borujerd have not issued public statements, Governor Moslem Moradi vaguely referenced the incident, attributing it to recent terrorist attacks and confrontations with criminal elements. Hengaw sources reject Moradi's claims, emphasizing that intelligence forces deliberately targeted the students, leading to Amirpour's death.

The association started with the targeted killing of former IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, whose body was so mutilated in a US drone strike in 2020 that people described him as a “cutlet,” a popular dish like burgers made of ground beef and potatoes.

Iranian regime opponents observe his death anniversary as "Cutlet Day" on various social media platforms, a symbolic protest act that has seen several people arrested. The recent surge in such surgical strikes has ushered in a "Cutlet Season” as dissident activists took to social media with different photos of cutlets. 

On Saturday, the IRGC confirmed that four of its forces lost their lives in the airstrikes on a building in the Mazzeh neighborhood in Damascus. A fifth IRGC officer later succumbed to his wounds and died. Among the dead was Hojatollah Omidvar, also known as Haj Sadegh and Yousef Omidzadeh, who served as the head of the RGC’s extraterritorial Quds force intelligence unit in Syria. According to Iranian state media, Omidvar’s deputy was also killed in the attack.

On December 25, another suspected Israeli airstrike targeted and killed another top Iranian IRGC general, Razi Mousavi, at his residence near Damascus. Additionally, several high-ranking military commanders of Iran-backed militia -- such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba in Iraq – were killed. On Sunday, three more IRGC members were killed in a US-led strike on Houthi rebels of Yemen. 

In addition to celebrating “Cutlet Season” and quipping about a more extensive menu by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a photo that is widely circulated is Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei surrounded with cutlet patties instead of a group of his inner circle. Another widely shared post is a symbolic weekly schedule of the Supreme Leader, with most of his week spent on funeral prayers for the slain IRGC generals.

The hardline daily Farhikhtegan has published a list of senior IRGC “military advisors” killed since 2015 in Syria, claiming that eight out of the total of 20 have been killed since Iran-backed Hamas started the war against Israel on October 7. The list probably ignored mid-ranking people as it pertains to only seven strikes while Israel has reportedly had around 600 airstrikes since April 2017.

The increasing fatalities among IRGC men have also led to speculations that Israel may have been tipped off about the whereabouts of the targets by Russia. Centrist Aftab News website in Tehran ran an article Sunday -- titled “The coordination between Israel and Russia in Syria is not very hidden” -- citing several Iranian officials and activists who mentioned the alleged coordination. 

Lawmaker Mohammad Esmail Kowsari, who is a former IRGC commander, said, “Spies in Damascus must be arrested." Addressing President Ebrahim Raisi, journalist Alireza Mostafa said, “Please ask President Vladimir Putin why the Russian S-400 air defense system is never activated in Syria to protect Iran's interests? Isn’t Russia a strategic ally of Iran?” 

According to conservative commentator Sadegh Hosseini, “Since the increased and consolidated presence of Russians in Syria, we have witnessed a rise in Israel’s aerial attacks against Iranian forces. The recent assassinations in Syria underscore the need for a reassessment of Iran-Russia relations in Syria.” 

The Islamic Republic's intelligence failures extend beyond overseas operations, evident in the recent twin blasts during Soleimani's death anniversary ceremonies in Kerman. Pointing the finger at Russia while Iranians are mocking IRGC casualties is further proof that Iranians do not take seriously the regime figures who keep threatening Israel with a firm response, but nothing happens.

Iran has been on the financial watchdog’s ‘blacklist’ in recent years for not adhering to transparency and international conventions against money laundering and terrorism financing. The Iranian government sent a letter to FATF earlier this month requesting Iran’s removal from its worst category that only two other countries in the world share: Myanmar and North Korea.

According to Iranian state media on Sunday, and an official post on X, the government has received a written response from the head of the FATF, confirming that it has instructed members to remove Iran from recommendation number 7. However, it seems that this does not mean Iran has been removed from the inter-state agency’s blacklist.

Recommendation #7 pertains to non-proliferation only. FATF website describes it as, “FATF Recommendation 7 requires countries to implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of weapons of mass destructions (WMD) and its financing.”

While this could have affected Iran because of the JCPOA nuclear agreement it concluded with world powers in 2015, and the subsequent UN Security Council Resolution 2231 restricting Tehran’s nuclear activities, Iran’s status on the blacklist is mainly due to its non-compliance with international financial standards.

Despite these preliminary determinations, the issue of the FATF letter allegedly received by Iran remains murky. First, a copy of Iran’s earlier letter to the agency has not been published and it is not clear what Tehran exactly asked FATF. Second, the response Iran says to have received has also not been published as of the time of this report, and it remains unclear what FATF has exactly said. 

FATF identifies problematic countries, and high-risk countries, in terms of financial dealings. It lists countries, “with serious strategic deficiencies to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing risks emanating from the country.”

FATF is an international organization formed by G7 member countries to protect the international financial system and its recommendations shape banking policies of most countries and businesses who want to protect their own integrity and reputations. Thus, Iran’s international banking is severely impacted by its status in the FATF blacklist.

To what extent the modification of Recommendation 7, if true, would have a positive impact on Iran remains to be seen. Iranian media presents the FATF letter, as claimed, to be a significant victory for Tehran, but it is too soon to reach a definitive assessment.