Exclusive: IRGC Interrogators Receiving Hefty Bribes
Iran International has obtained court proceedings of a significant corruption case that reveal several IRGC prison interrogators have received hefty bribes.
Iran International has obtained court proceedings of a significant corruption case that reveal several IRGC prison interrogators have received hefty bribes.
The 10 pages of the document reviewed revealed the names of seven members of Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-IO), who work as interrogators in major corruption cases that usually involve people with links to the regime. Each of these IRGC officials – the so-called ‘judicial enforcers’ -- has received money from several people charged with economic crimes.
The document exposes high-ranking officials, including Mohammad Mehdi Badi, IRGC-IO's deputy interrogator for economic crimes, who accepted huge sums of money. Only in one case, he received $400,000 and €60,000 from Rouhollah Danialzadeh, known as the “Sultan of Steel” in Iran because of his mafia-like network over the steel industry.
Danialzadeh was one of the key people indicted in the court case involving Akbar Tabari, the Iranian Judiciary’s former Executive Vice President and Finance Director for over two decades, who ran a bribery network. His network orchestrated a massive corruption and bribery scheme involving numerous officials, most of whom evaded accountability, as is often the case with individuals tied to the Islamic Republic. Danialzadeh’s verdict, including a 15-year prison term, was overturned several months after it was issued. It is not clear from the document if his conviction was overturned because of bribery.
According to Iran International’s Mojtaba Pourmohsen, IRGC's Badi also received tens of thousands of dollars from Esmaeil Khalilzadeh, the former chairman of the board of directors of Tehran’s Esteghlal Football Club and the owner of a large hotel in Iran’s northern Gilan province. He was arrested by the IRGC-IO in 2021 on charges of financial corruption in a big case about a silk factory.
The document also revealed that another business crime boss called Hadi Darvishvand, who owns Kermanshah Refinery in eastern Iran, gave the IRGC-IO's deputy interrogator for economic crimes $47,000, €48,000 and 150 gold coins.
Another senior IRGC-IO interrogator who received handsome bribes was Behnam Hajipour Khireh-Masjedi, who was one the interrogators in the case of Sina Estavi, the CEO of a cryptocurrency exchange company. Estavi’s case, involving over $20 million in embezzlement, has 51,000 complainants, mostly ordinary citizens who lost their money in Estavi’s cryptocurrency scam. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison, 75 lashes, fines, asset forfeiture, and a travel ban. He escaped from Iran in November.
According to journalist Mohsen Sazegara, such cases are proof that the Islamic Republic’s measures to address economic corruption are "nothing but empty promises." He told Iran International that the IRGC-IO is the biggest intelligence service in Iran and is closely tied to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba, claiming that “It is also the most corrupt intelligence outfit of Iran.”
Major corruption cases in Iran involve regime insiders, officials and their business partners. If a case is exposed by rival factions, usually there is a lack of transparency involving legal proceedings. Some of the accused can avoid any consequences as a clear and full picture never emerges.
Economics professor, Vahid Shahri, told local media that the government’s annual budget deficit of a few billions of dollars is not the most serious issue. What is crucial is the declining energy and water resources in the country, serious imbalances in the economy, lack of money in the government pension funds and other shortages. These imbalances will add pressure to the government every year and require larger operating budgets.
“The government should consider all of these deficits in its economic analysis, and the problem lies in the fact that the government does not see these deficits, even though it will be responsible for financing every single one of them,” Shahri argued.
Iran is facing a serious economic crisis since the United States withdrew from the JCPAO nuclear accord and imposed sanctions in 2018. However, the country’s economic vows go much deeper, as the Islamic regime failed to leverage its oil export revenues to properly invest in infrastructure and development since the 1990s. It is estimated that Iran sold around $1.5 trillion of oil in the past two decades, yet it faces a bankrupt government that has a stranglehold over 80 percent of the economy.
Shahri explained that in order to prevent a catastrophic situation, the government needs to spend $100-150 billion annually in the next few years. If this investment is not made, the cumulative effect of imbalances can lead to the collapse of the system.
Restricted by US oil export sanctions, Iran sells its crude at lower prices to China and earns around $30 billion per year, with no other significant revenues in hard currencies. This does not even cover the annual budget of the government and there are no other funds for long-term investment.
Government officials have recently admitted that most of the $150-billion National Development Fund, or the sovereign wealth fund has been spent, since 2012, leaving nothing for investment. Foreign investments are also virtually non-existent due to sanctions and lack of political confidence in the Islamic Republic regime that has adversarial relations with Western countries and a government-controlled economy.
A report in Tehran media on Monday showed that there are more than 2,000 registered quasi-governmental companies that are often exempt from taxes, enjoy monopolies and avoid any accountability. These companies are run by regime insiders as their private fiefdoms, and often when they lose money, they turn to borrow from government banks, which are also run through the same political network of government loyalists.
Shahri argued that the fundamental imbalances also exacerbate Iran’s high annual inflation rate, which hovers at around 50 percent.
“If we cannot address these deficits, Iran will enter a hyperinflation path. It should be noted that hyperinflation does not mean a 40% inflation growth per year; rather, it means a 50% inflation growth every month. In this case, Iran will face unprecedented conditions. If we cannot control the imbalances, we are destined for hyperinflation in the next 5 years,” the economist emphasized.
Most commentators in Iran, along with many regime politicians, frequently attribute the current economic difficulties to President Ebrahim Raisi's weak administration. This perspective often overlooks the country's foreign policy, which is typically viewed as the domain of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. US and European sanctions and a lack of foreign investments have left Iran with sole reliance on limited oil exports.
Additionally, commentators often neglect to address the fundamental causes of economic inefficiencies, which critics argue stem from a government-controlled economy that fosters corruption and nepotism.
Ali-Akbar Alvandian, the secretary of the Association of Employers of the Cement Industry in Iran, has reported a several-fold increase in Mazut consumption in cement factories.
Alvandian informed ILNA news agency on January 12 that the gas consumption of the country's cement factories has decreased to 6 million cubic meters per day in winter, while their usual daily consumption stands at 27 million cubic meters. He revealed that 70% of the country's cement production now relies on Mazut fuel.
Iran faces a significant natural gas shortage during the winter, leading to the utilization of the highly polluting Mazut as an alternative fuel. While one liter of Mazut can replace one cubic meter of gas, its pollution levels are substantially higher than those of natural gas.
According to the Environment Agency of the German government as well as US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the direct CO2 emissions of Mazut (fuel oil) are 33% higher than natural gas. Iran’s Mazut also contains 3.5% sulfur, which is approximately seven times higher than the required standards for ship fuel, making it far more pollutant than natural gas.
Alvandian continued, mentioning that factories located away from urban areas use Mazut as an alternative fuel, but factories near cities have excluded furnaces have reduced its use.
He further disclosed that, on a general scale, 70 percent of the country's cement production now relies on Mazut fuel. Given the daily gas requirement of 27 million cubic meters for cement factories across the country, the current delivery of six million cubic meters per day combined with the production of 70 percent of the country's cement using Mazut, indicates that approximately 13 million liters of Mazut are used daily in Iran's cement production.
A document from the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC), obtained by Iran International, reveals that Iran uses Mazut in cement factories even during the warm seasons. According to this document, the average gas delivery to cement factories during the summer was around 20 million liters per day, indicating that the sector used roughly 7 million liters of Mazut daily at full capacity.
Iran is currently grappling with a gas shortage not only in the cold seasons but also in spring and summer, leading to the utilization of Mazut as a fuel source.
Another document from the Ministry of Oil illustrates that Iran consumed 19 million liters of Mazut daily in industries and power plants during the spring and summer of the previous year. Mazut consumption in these sectors surges to 45 million liters per day in winter, with daily diesel consumption increasing by 10 million liters from summer to winter, reaching 127 million liters. This increase is attributed to a higher substitution of diesel with natural gas in the power and industrial sectors.
Alvandian has noted that the cost of cement production with Mazut is higher than the cost of production with gas, posing a dilemma for cement factories in the eastern part of the country that have switched to Mazut. He mentioned, "Cement factories are forced to source their required Mazut from the Rey and Tehran oil storage facilities, and the cost of transporting Mazut from Tehran to the eastern provinces is added to the production cost of these units."
Despite the country not experiencing the same level of cold as the previous year, gas consumption for domestic households remains unchanged compared to last year, making restrictions on gas supply to industries, including cement factories, inevitable, according to officials.
Statistics from the National Iranian Gas Company reveal that on Friday, January 12, the breakdown of gas consumption was as follows: the household sector consumed 385 million cubic meters, the transportation sector consumed 27.5 million cubic meters, the public and commercial sector consumed 60.5 million cubic meters, the agricultural sector consumed 27.5 million cubic meters, and the small industries sector consumed 60.5 million cubic meters. In total, these sectors accounted for 550 million cubic meters of gas consumption, which is 3.3 times higher than summer consumption.
The substantial increase in gas consumption in these sectors has compelled the government to significantly reduce gas supply to major industries, including cement, steel, petrochemicals, and others.
A document from the National Petrochemical Company indicates that Iran's petrochemical production capacity was 91.5 million tons last year. However, due to gas shortages in the fall and winter, as well as power outages in the summer, only two-thirds of this capacity was operational, resulting in actual petrochemical production in the country totaling only 59.7 million tons.
In a related context, Mehdi Mahdavi Abhari, the Secretary-General of the Petrochemical Employers Association, announced last week that Iran lost $800 million in petrochemical exports due to gas supply shortages last year.
The document from the National Gas Company reveals that during the summer, nearly 70 million cubic meters of gas were supplied daily to petrochemical plants, 20 million cubic meters to cement factories, 36.5 million cubic meters to steel mills, and 17.7 million cubic meters to refineries. In total, during the summer, 145.5 million cubic meters of gas were delivered to the country's major industries. However, on January 12 this year, this figure decreased to 110 million cubic meters.
Although Iran's winter is still relatively mild, last year, on some days, gas consumption in the residential, commercial, and small industrial sectors in Iran had reached nearly 650 million cubic meters. This resulted in Iran facing a daily gas deficit of 250 million cubic meters last winter.