Iranian MP Accuses Mossad, Israel Of Involvement In Kerman Blasts
A member of the Iranian parliament pointed fingers at Israel, repeating accusations that they were involved in the twin bombings that rocked Kerman on January 3.
A member of the Iranian parliament pointed fingers at Israel, repeating accusations that they were involved in the twin bombings that rocked Kerman on January 3.
Abbas Golroo, belonging to the hardliner faction and member of the parliament's national security committee, made the comments in a Sunday interview with Jamaran website.
The Kerman attacks resulted in nearly one hundred deaths and hundreds of injuries along the route leading to a cemetery, where former IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani is buried.
While the ISIS of Afghanistan claimed responsibility for the suicide bombings, social media speculation within Iran continues, with some accusing the country's security and intelligence agencies of orchestrating the attacks to garner sympathy for the regime.
Golroo claimed that Iran has played a role in attacks against Israeli targets in European countries. He also highlighted Hamas' recent attack as a “successful challenge to Israel's defense capabilities.” He hinted at ongoing and planned actions against the Israeli interests in various regions.
“A portion of the actions that we receive reports about is actively taken against this regime, both in European countries and within the occupied territories, as well as in the region. Additional actions are also being planned,” added the MP.
Despite accusations against Israel for allegedly organizing the Kerman incident, the United States rejected any suggestion of Israeli or American involvement in the Kerman explosions.
Contrary to what has been presented so far in the discussion on succession after Ali Khamenei, this article will not speculate about the time of his death, the identity of his successor, power struggles between the clerics and the IRGC, or the role of China, Russia, and the West in the matter. Instead, we will delve into the decision-making process. Presenting two sets of facts concerning the background of power transfer from Khomeini to Khamenei and from Khamenei to the next leader, should the regime remain intact.
1989: Smooth Transition
After Khomeini's death, the succession process unfolded relatively smoothly, devoid of tension, and can be attributed to five key factors. Firstly, the presence of an influential figure like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who held sway among middle, left, and right-wing officials within the system, played a pivotal role. Rafsanjani was essentially a ‘kingmaker’ who not only influenced Khamenei's ascent to power with his unverifiable narratives but also held sway over numerous pivotal institutions, from parliament and the executive branch to state media, the police force, IRGC, and the Ministry of Information.
Secondly, a five-member board comprised of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Abdul Karim Mousavi Ardebili, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Khamenei, and Ahmad Khomeini made critical decisions during Khomeini's illness, exercising comprehensive control over all centers of power. This board effectively prevented marginal power centers from gaining influence, holding the reins of coercive powers after the removal of Hossein Ali Montazeri and his supporters from key positions. Montazeri had been Khamenei’s designated successor who had fallen out of favor before the leader’s death.
Among second-tier officials, there existed dozens of relatively influential figures aligned with different political factions, including Ali Meshkini, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, and Ahmad Azari Qomi on the right, and Jalaluddin Taheri, Yusuf Sanei, and Mohammad Mousavi Khoiniha on the left. Political groups were attentive to their advice, which mitigated concerns within security and military institutions regarding infighting. Additionally, only a minimal number of Islamist figures were subjected to persecution, torture, or harassment by the regime, which limited internal opposition to the new leader.
The absence of any significant social movement in the post-war period left the regime with ample latitude to designate the next leader. Consequently, both Khomeini's funeral and the Experts Assembly session that elected Khamenei, unfolded without societal tension or challenges. While the populace might not have been content with the status quo, the absence of a sizable opposing movement or dissenting voices was notable.
Furthermore, the tranquil security and political landscape in the region after the Iran-Iraq war, combined with the relative weakening of the Iranian navy by the US in the southern waters, contributed to the smooth transition of power. There was a notable absence of perceived foreign threats to the regime.
Turbulent Transition
After Khamenei's passing, the situation will not be as peaceful as before, as none of the five conditions mentioned earlier will apply. Instead, the opposite circumstances are in place. There is no one within Ali Khamenei's inner circle who possesses the stature, power, and influence of Hashemi Rafsanjani, capable of assuming the role of a "king-maker." Rafsanjani's absence poses a greater threat to the system than his presence would have. In totalitarian systems, individuals often play a more significant role compared to institutions.
Khamenei's close associates, such as the head of his office, the president, or the head of the Expediency Council, are more disliked among the people and political figures than Khamenei himself. Even cabinet members and lawmakers view them with disdain. The removal of Qasem Soleimani by President Donald Trump in 2020 had a considerable impact, as Soleimani could have been such a kingmaker. Even the reformists praised him for his role in advancing their agenda and did not consider him an adversary.
Khamenei has transferred power primarily to IRGC commanders but has consistently rotated them, preventing any one of them from developing significant influence. Figures like Hossein Salami, the commander of the IRGC, and Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force, are not taken seriously by most. Beyond the upper echelon, there is no alternative power center capable of leading state affairs. Various power centers on the periphery, in the form of factions and dormant assets, could be rapidly mobilized.
Former high-ranking officials have been either isolated or eliminated, losing their previous support base. They have been marginalized to the point of becoming detested by insiders. The well-know influencers within the regime are now the preachers, eulogists, and Basij members, all unpopular among the public. There is a lack of charismatic political figures.
In 2024, numerous political and social movements are active and prepared to exploit any power vacuum. Hundreds of thousands of young individuals, suppressed during the Mahsa movement, and families who have lost loved ones may take to the streets under the right conditions. However, the government has become more repressive and brutal. The next confrontation between the opposition and the government will likely result in more casualties on both sides. Society is in turmoil due to the regime's oppression and abuses, making it unlikely for the government to rely on silence and social passivity during the succession process.
The regime's interventions across the Middle East have led regional countries to view the Islamic Republic as a threat and welcome any domestic instability and turmoil in Iran. When Israel can remove nuclear and military officials openly and steal nuclear documents without significant repercussions, it is evident that more significant actions can be taken in a chaotic situation.
For these five reasons, there is no one to jump-start the leadership "junk car" in the event of a jurist guardian's death, allowing the next jurist guardian to seize the steering wheel. In such a situation, those seeking control will likely have to engage in internal power struggles.
Despite the limited number of leadership candidates backed by influential factions, there are imminent violent clashes between these factions for three key reasons:
An official of the Greater Tehran Police told Etemad Online on January 10 that the three men responsible for shooting Hani Kordeh (a nickname) a day earlier were arrested at their hideout and promised further information later.
Iranian newspapers claim Hani Kordeh, whose real name is not mentioned anywhere in the media, has close ties with some high-profile politicians, officials, and a former coach of Esteghlal FC. There have been allegations that he has collaborated with Iran's security and intelligence bodies for years.
In 2018, Hani Kordeh posted videos of himself on Instagram suggesting that he was involved in the fight against Bishar al-Assad’s opposition in Syria alongside IRGC forces.
In one of the videos that showed him in Syria, he appears with a group of IRGC soldiers with a rifle on his shoulder bragging and vowing to crush the enemy. In other videos he is shown visiting a Shiite shrine in Damascus. Fighting in Syria allowed him to call himself a “Defender of the Shrine”, a misleading title reserved for the forces that were sent to Syria.
The tens of thousands of Iranian, Afghan and other forces that the IRGC deployed in Syria were simply there to save the country’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad, not to defend any shrine.
Omid Shams, a UK-based human rights lawyer, believes the publication of these images was a form of propaganda for the IRGC forces which were sustaining heavy casualties in Syria but confirmed the statements of Brigadier General Hossein Hamdani in 2015 about the recruitment of criminals and thugs into the IRGC's combat ranks in 2009.
Hamedani who was head of the IRGC's Rassoulollah Corps in charge of Greater Tehran from November 2009 until January 2014, admitted in an interview that in 2009 he had recruited 5,000 “apolitical” violent criminals and organized them in three battalions to suppress the Green Movement protests following the disputed presidential election that brought Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power.
The opposition has for many years alleged that the IRGC employs the services of thugs and hooligans to quell anti-government protests. Shams and some other Iran experts also believe that the Fatehin Brigade, the first of the IRGC’s Basij volunteer forces to be sent to Syria to fight alongside Assad forces under the command of the extraterritorial Quds Force, must have been the IRGC unit Hamedani used to organize thugs in 2009.
“These [videos] also proved that the main force, which recruits criminals and thugs is Fatehin (Conquerors) Special Forces has specifically been active in deadly suppression of popular protests, both in Iran and in Syria. The role of this unit in suppressing the recent [Woman, Life, Freedom] protests was confirmed after Ebrahim Raisi’s meeting with Fatehin forces,” Shams wrote in December 2022.
Hamedani who was killed in Syria in October 2015 was twice decorated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and promoted to major general posthumously. He was subjected to international sanctions in April 2011, including by Britain, the European Union, the United States and Canada for human rights violations.
Hani Kordeh is said to have been born in 1980s in Hamedan in western Iran and spent sixteen years of his life in prison since the age of fourteen. He has been wounded in gang fights several times including in 2019 when he was critically stabbed nearly fatally by the leader of a rival gang in Tehran and his hospitalization made headlines.
The notorious man who many including police officials often refer to as a thug and ruffian has been well known for many years for his criminal activities including extortion, organizing as well as leading football thugs and numerous violent gangland wars. His source of income is not clear, but in social media posts he often appears on the streets of the capital driving an expensive Porsche.
He has also claimed on various occasions that he runs a drug rehabilitation facility in the south of Tehran.
